When Santander released a set of open source AI tools this month, the move ran quickly through the headlines,[1] while the four decades of capability building that turned it into one of Europe's largest banks did not. This is understandable since that process is slow and largely invisible,[2] but it is the foundations that gave the headlines a stage to dance on. Consistently, at the moments when rivals were most constrained, Santander has been able to exploit options those rivals didn't have available to them.
By looking at how that foundation was built, a pattern emerges that is not unique to only large banks - a coherent capability system widens the range of options open to an organisation of any size, in any sector. These patterns are transferable and worth unpacking, and Santander is a great illustrative case study.
The foundations are the real story
For Santander, what compounded over those four decades was not a run of clever, opportunistic deals but a capability that turned deals into advantage. Santander built a standardised operating model, originally the core banking platform Partenón, and used it to absorb the banks it acquired onto common systems rather than running a federation of incompatible ones. Abbey National, Alliance & Leicester and Bradford & Bingley were each migrated onto that platform.[3] The competence was industrialised integration rather than target selection.
That capability resided in a system whose parts reinforced one another. Capital discipline and geographic diversification made acquisitions affordable and kept earnings steady across the cycle, so the bank stayed strong while others weakened.
The clearest test came in the global financial crisis. Already profitable, Santander raised €7.2 billion from its shareholders in November 2008, when British peers such as RBS and HBOS could not raise from the market at all.[4] That let it act as a buyer rather than a casualty, taking on the deposits and branches of the failed Bradford & Bingley and acquiring Alliance & Leicester while RBS was being rescued by the government.[5] It never posted a quarterly loss through the period,[6] and when Spain's own banking crisis broke in 2012 it stayed outside the €41 billion rescue that recapitalised the savings banks and Bankia.[7]
What the system makes possible
But the lesson is not in the deals, rather in the coherent capability system that developed as an accumulation of deliberate, long-term choices whose parts compound. For Santander, it was about capital discipline that made the acquisitions affordable, the standardised model that absorbed them, and the diversification that followed to fund the next move.
This system, even under constraining conditions, gives greater choice than would be available otherwise. When crises came that sank weaker rivals, Santander could choose where to expand rather than fight to survive, because it had set itself up for a wider range of choices than its peers.
Copying the specific moves is the wrong conclusion - the conditions that made them valuable have passed, and Santander itself has moved on, growing organically now rather than buying rivals in a crisis.[8] What transfers is the observation that a coherent system of differentiating capabilities continues to produce more options even as conditions change - which clearly require decisiveness to exploit them.
Applying to a constrained sector - mutual banking
While it may seem that this strategic approach is the reserve of multinational organisations with deep resources to invest, it's worth remembering that Santander started as a small lender in Spain.
If anything, this discipline is ideal for the organisations that look short of options, such as mutual banks, which can seem boxed in. They cannot issue ordinary shares, must fund growth largely from retained earnings, and typically operate a cost base that favours scale.[9]
But set those constraints aside to explore a different question. What would it look like for a mutual to take what is already characteristic of it and build that into a capability system?
Starting with ownership, a mutual has no external shareholders to satisfy, free to shape its proposition tightly around the members it chooses to serve, rather than the mass market a listed competitor must pursue.
Add to that its closeness to the communities it serves, whether through a branch, a presence at local events, or a shared occupation or bond. On its own that closeness is sentiment, but used deliberately, it can become valuable insight - a granular understanding of what members actually need, and the raw material for services and niche products relevant enough to generate demand that a national bank, holding millions of customers at arm's length, cannot easily read, let alone serve.[9]
The sector has also already earned its members' trust, where customer-owned banks record materially higher customer satisfaction than the majors, close to 90 per cent against the majors' 75 on Roy Morgan's main-institution measure, and they rate as the most trusted category in banking.[10] That is a standing advocacy base, latent until it is purposefully converted into referral and growth.
And the patient horizon the ownership model affords gives a system like this the time it takes to build.
None of these is an option in itself, but each is a differentiating characteristic the sector already has. An effective capability system converts differentiators into capabilities that work together - and are hard to copy. A mutual that builds that system will have more choice than optimising its path to an inevitable merger, while also delivering greater value to members.
Setting up for choices requires investment
But none of this is free or easy. The decision-making patience critical to long-term value that a mutual inherits through its governance structure is not an achievement but an enabler - left passive it becomes drift, sometimes disguised as 'strategic'. The foundation for an effective capability system needs to be designed, and progress is slow and unglamorous. It competes for attention and resource with whatever is generating headlines this quarter. Choosing to invest in it anyway, without the benefit of hindsight, is what separates organisations with options from the ones that wish they did.
These systems don't have to be complex, sophisticated, or expensive - they need to be relevant and something the organisation can really get behind to create value. They are made effective by diagnosing the situation and the organisation's real capabilities, then focusing on the problem worth solving.
That is what Polaris does with clients, and it is how the odds get beaten, not through the boldness of any single move but by setting the organisation up to keep choosing well as the conditions around it change.
Sources:
- Banco Santander, SantanderAI open-source organisation (GitHub, June 2026).
- S&P Global, Banco Santander ranked among Europe's largest banks by assets (2026).
- UK Parliament, Banking Standards written evidence (Partenón core banking platform used to consolidate and run acquired banks, including Abbey, Alliance & Leicester and Bradford & Bingley); Computer Weekly, 'Santander core banking and the move to the cloud' (2024-2025).
- Reuters / CNBC, 'Santander launches €7.2 billion rights issue' (10 November 2008).
- 2008 United Kingdom bank rescue package; UK Office for Budget Responsibility and National Audit Office data on the cost of interventions (Bradford & Bingley deposits and branches sold to Santander; RBS rescued).
- Chicago Booth Review, interview with José Antonio Álvarez, Group CEO, Banco Santander (Santander avoided quarterly losses through the crisis, unlike several European peers).
- European Stability Mechanism, 'Spain: the ESM's first programme' and Spain assistance overview (€41.33 billion disbursed to Spanish banks, principally the savings banks and BFA-Bankia).
- Institutional Investor, 'Ana Botín Marks a New Era at Banco Santander'; Bloomberg, on Santander's organic-growth focus and capital discipline under Ana Botín (2025); Banco Santander, press release on the acquisition of Webster Bank (February 2026).
- Council of Financial Regulators, Review into Small and Medium-sized Banks: Issues Paper (December 2024), on mutuals' reliance on retained earnings, relative cost base, routes to scale through collaboration and shared services, and customer-owned banks' rootedness in their geographic communities as a competitive differentiator (citing KPMG, 'Sector Impact Assessment of Customer Owned Banking in Australia', 2023).
- Roy Morgan, Customer Satisfaction Consumer Banking in Australia (customer-owned banks 89.5 per cent main-financial-institution satisfaction against 75.4 per cent for the major banks, 12 months to May 2024), reported by the Customer Owned Banking Association; and Roy Morgan Risk Monitor (the customer-owned banking sector recorded the highest net trust of any banking category, ranking 7th of 27 industries, 12 months to January 2025).


